

## LIBERT, AUTHORITY, AND THE NEW POLITICS

### A RECONSIDERATION

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#### ABSTRACT

Many scholars have argued that political values in advanced democracies have significantly changed and specifically that the right and left have realigned along new value dimensions. Herbert Kitschelt is one of the principal proponents of this view, arguing that political conflict in mature democracies is increasingly organized around a right-authoritarian versus left-libertarian dimension. We reconsider this argument both theoretically and empirically. Our replication of Kitschelt's analysis raises doubts about construct validity, as well as about his empirical results. Second, our analysis of survey data from the Euro-Barometer and World Values Surveys leads us to question the claim that the political left is libertarian and the right authoritarian. Third, we find no significant evidence that conservative partisans less enthusiastically embrace the most common forms of democratic participation than do those on the left. Finally, our analysis of the contents of their respective programs does not demonstrate that leftist parties are more libertarian than those on the right or that, in recent decades, the former have particularly trended in a libertarian direction.

**KEY WORDS** • authoritarian • cleavages • communitarianism • Ideology • Left • libertarian • partisanship • political values • political participation • Right • World Values Survey

#### **Introduction: Value Change in Advanced Democracies**

One of the positive features of democracy is that governments respond to shifts in public opinion (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Hence, there is tremendous interest among political scientists in political values – stable orientations that are expected to explain both political preferences and behavior. For several decades, scholars have argued that a shift has taken place in political values in the advanced capitalist democracies. Daniel Bell (1973, 1976) explored the rise of post-industrial values. Subsequently, Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1990) has measured the rise of ‘post-materialist’ values throughout

the world and especially in the affluent western nations.<sup>1</sup> The rise of new political values has coincided with the decline of class-based voting and perhaps with a decline in the importance of the issues that have traditionally served as the basis for left–right political divisions (e.g. Dalton, 2002).

A common observation in many studies of value change has been the growing importance that contemporary citizens, across national boundaries, attach to personal freedom and self-expression. Concomitantly, many studies have found a decline in attachment to traditional political values and authorities. Comparative scholarship has also sought to explore the implications of these value trends for partisanship and political identities. According to some observers, these developments have created a new dimensionality to party politics, with the left increasingly associated with post-materialist or post-modern value priorities and the right gaining support from those who have not embraced these new values. It has been claimed that the growing valuation of personal freedom is associated with the politics and parties of the left, whereas the political right is attached to declining and archaic forms of political order and, in some cases, to new expressions of authoritarianism.

It is in this tradition that Herbert Kitschelt (1992, 1994, 1995) has proposed a new characterization of left–right orientations in Europe, driven by structural changes in mature democratic capitalism. Kitschelt's main concerns are with the evolution of democratic party systems and perhaps specifically with the changing and differing fortunes of social democrats in Western Europe (Kitschelt, 1994). Kitschelt seeks the explanations of these differing fortunes in electoral strategies as well as in organizational developments. But underlying these organizational choices is a process that has fundamentally changed the formation of preferences in contemporary capitalist societies. Changes in citizens' market, occupational, and lifestyle experiences have brought about a realignment of the policy space in which contemporary political parties have to compete. This space can be characterized through a two-dimensional representation, in which a left–right (socialist versus capitalist) dimension is cross-cut by a libertarian versus authoritarian dimension.

Sweeping social change 'has shifted the main axis of voter distribution from a simple alternative between socialist (left) and capitalist (right) politics to a more complex configuration opposing left-libertarian and right-authoritarian alternatives' (Kitschelt, 1994: 30–1). Thus, voters that identify with the left are increasingly libertarian and those on the right similarly authoritarian. While this shift in the distribution of voter preferences creates serious dilemmas for the programmatic and organizational choices of social

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1. Although see the critiques in Duch and Taylor (1993) and Clarke and Dutt (1991).

democrats (and other parties), the future seems to belong to those parties of the left that embrace the new libertarian appeals. As Kitschelt (1994: 38) puts it, 'all socialist "winners" in the 1980s diluted their organizational and electoral linkages to working-class constituencies, failed to develop or weakened the existing mass party organization, and moved away from leftist distributive appeals'.

Kitschelt's influential work contains a number of bold and important claims with broad implications. Among Kitschelt's claims, or those that can be reasonably be inferred from his work, are the following ones.

1. Among mass publics, libertarian and authoritarian political values load on a single dimension, where libertarian values constitute one end point and authoritarian values the other (Kitschelt, 1992: 13).
2. Among mass publics, political libertarianism is not positively correlated with support for economic freedom and capitalism.
3. Among mass publics, there is an 'elective affinity' such that individuals identifying with the political left tend to express stronger support for libertarian values than do individuals identifying with the political right (Kitschelt, 1995: 8).
4. Conversely, respondents on the political right are more likely to support authoritarian values.
5. Individuals identifying with the political left exhibit higher levels of political participation than individuals identifying with the political right.
6. Increasingly, political parties associated with the political left express stronger support for libertarian values than do political parties identifying with the political right (Kitschelt, 1994: 30–2).

In this article, we examine these claims and their implications. We begin by examining Kitschelt's theoretical and operational definition of left-libertarianism. As we show in the next section, Kitschelt's theoretical conception of libertarianism is unorthodox and not entirely clear, and his operational measure runs into a number of problems. We then point out that even by Kitschelt's own definitions, support for his argument is problematic. We, therefore, propose a set of simpler and more appropriate measures by which we go on to examine the six propositions listed earlier. Our aim in later sections of the paper is less to replicate Kitschelt's research than to address broader questions about contemporary value change.

We show that, given more appropriate measures than those used by Kitschelt, there is scant support for these theses. At best, we find weak and generally insignificant associations between the relevant variables. At worst, the results run directly counter to these six propositions. Thus, our results suggest that the patterns of value change in contemporary democracies are significantly more complex than they have hitherto appeared. We also believe

that certain biases in the conceptualization and measurement of political values have contributed to the incomplete state of our knowledge.

Our concerns are not just with the conception and measurement of libertarianism but also with the empirical correlates that Kitschelt and others propose. Moreover, we suggest an alternative perspective on the structure of the electoral issue space. We find little systematic evidence to suggest that the issue space is anchored, at one end, by right-authoritarianism and, at the other end, by left-libertarianism. Rather, an important component of the electoral issue space is best considered a libertarian versus communitarian issue dimension. At one end of this continuum, we find demands for self-expression, autonomy, and individual liberties. At the other end are concerns with community, with social cohesion and integration, and with identity politics. Such concerns are found on the left as well as on the right, though in the current political debate, leftist communitarians are more prominent. Libertarianism implies support for individual rights and liberties and a limited role for the state; communitarianism implies support for activist collective governance (either at the national or community level) and tends to favor community interests over those of the individual. It is this value dimension that structures much of the political debate and electoral preferences in modern democracies.

Authoritarianism is yet another matter. There may be a significant 'authoritarian' component to the electorates' values but it is a separate value dimension that is independent of, and only weakly correlated with, the libertarian–communitarian and left–right divides. Authoritarians value order but order comes in myriad forms and political colorations. Even though libertarians are generally skeptical toward authority, they do not reject all forms of order. And even to the extent that authoritarian values are inimical to freedom, we are not convinced that they have typically become the domain of the political right. We agree that there are elements of the right, particularly the radical right, that embrace authoritarian and illiberal values. But the radical left (e.g. Stalinism or Maoism) certainly has its own fair share of authoritarian orientations. And as we demonstrate later, we find no evidence that conservative partisans, in particular the moderate right, are significantly less supportive of libertarian values than are partisans of the left (either moderate or extreme).

### **Defining Left-libertarianism**

Kitschelt's scholarship on left-libertarianism has come to be widely recognized. Yet, pinning down his conception of libertarianism is not straightforward. Kitschelt (1994: 22) notes:

Libertarian politics envisions autonomous institutions beyond state and market (negative freedoms) that endow individuals with citizens' rights to participate in the governance of collective affairs (positive freedoms). Libertarians demand greater individual autonomy in shaping personal and collective identities, the transformation of gender roles, and an ethic of enjoyment rather than of accumulation and order.

Kitschelt (1992: 13) characterizes the new political dimension as follows:

For this reason, cleavages on the procedural dimension of democratic politics range from an 'authoritarian' position (favoring narrow scope of democracy and primarily hierarchical mode of collective decision making) to a 'libertarian' alternative (broad scope/participatory mode). My use of the concept 'libertarian' is rooted in the European linguistic convention that associates the term with anarchist and syndicalist theories of direct democracy, sympathetic to the self-organization of autonomous individuals and voluntary associations in collective decision-making processes. In contrast, the American linguistic convention tends to conflate economic liberalism and political libertarianism, a usage I wish to avoid.

Kitschelt takes issue with the latter definition of political libertarianism, arguing that it should be much more broadly construed to include a variety of 'positive' freedoms. He makes the case that libertarian politics, particularly with respect to participation, should be defined as 'positive' (as opposed to 'negative') freedom.

Kitschelt's definition of libertarian attitudes is hardly conventional – in fact, it is rather sweeping and ideological. One problem with his 'expansive' definition of political libertarianism is that it can be construed to include a panoply of 'positive' demands, many of which do not obviously promote individual liberty. For example, we question Kitschelt's inclusion of support for a feminist agenda as an appropriate component of contemporary libertarianism. Some feminist demands (such as the dismantling of barriers to women's political and economic achievement) are clearly more libertarian than others (such as punitive responses to sexually explicit or otherwise offensive speech).

Even if one's main libertarian commitment is to positive political liberties, it is far from obvious that economic liberties need, in any way, be antithetical. Thus, Amartya Sen, who conceives of positive freedom as the very core of social development, has no room for a libertarianism that is opposed to market freedoms: 'freedom of exchange and transaction is itself part and parcel of the basic liberties that people have reason to value. To be *generically against* markets would be almost as odd as being generically against conversations between people' (Sen, 1999: 6; emphasis in the original).

We think of a libertarian in simpler and more generally recognized terms as 'one who approves of or advocates liberty' (*Oxford English Dictionary*). As it is generally understood, libertarianism encompasses the defense of both economic (*laissez-faire* capitalism and property rights) and political (participation, free speech, and individual freedoms) freedoms (see, e.g., Boaz, 1997).

And contrary to Kitschelt, the present authors, neither of whom hails from the United States, do not recognize this usage as peculiarly American.

One might argue that there is a separate social libertarianism associated with permissive attitudes toward social groups such as, for example, homosexuals and religious fundamentalists. Yet there are two major problems in identifying such social libertarianism. One is distinguishing permissiveness from personal approval. Libertarianism is reflected in permissive attitudes even toward groups whose causes or lifestyles one might personally find unappealing. It is, therefore, a problem if the measures one adopts tap approval or sympathy rather than permissiveness. Another problem is that permissiveness often varies systematically across different target groups. Those people that are most permissive toward homosexuals, for example, may not be the same that are most permissive toward zealots from religious minorities. Many existing survey items, we believe, are suspect on one or both of these grounds. Therefore, and because our main interest lies in the relationship between economic and specifically political values, we focus our analysis on political and economic aspects of libertarianism.

### **Measuring Libertarianism**

While we favor definitions that are simple, balanced, and consistent with common usage, their very purpose is to enable us to characterize the contemporary patterns of value change in a precise and testable fashion. Let us, therefore, proceed to the operational measure of libertarianism on which Kitschelt conducts his analysis. One of the empirical bases for Kitschelt's characterization of the contemporary political issue space is a factor analysis of nine items included in the 1986 Euro-Barometer (EB 25). Three socio-demographic measures are included in the analysis: age, education, and occupation (defined as white collar/student versus other). Kitschelt also includes a set of attitudinal factors: a left-right identification item, religiosity, and a measure of post-materialism. Finally, there is a set of behavioral measures evaluating the respondent's readiness to participate in the ecology, anti-nuclear, and peace movements, respectively.

Kitschelt conducts a principal components analysis of these attitudinal, sociodemographic and behavioral variables country-by-country and in a pooled cross-national analysis of eight Western European democracies. His analysis, and specifically the first dimension of his solution, confirms the predominance of his left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian spatial clustering, as leftist orientations tend to be positively associated with post-materialism, youth, education, secularism, and willingness to join the relevant social movements. This clustering or correlation of attitudes and behaviors is critical to Kitschelt's argument because it empirically confirms

his notion that the left is distinctly liberal, anti-authoritarian, and supportive of participatory democracy (and the right the opposite).<sup>2</sup>

Yet one problem with Kitschelt's analysis is that it includes such a variety of indicators: sociodemographic characteristics, social and political values (Kitschelt [1994: 137] calls them 'dispositions'), and readiness to join particular political movements. We find it odd, to say the least, to include such variables as age and education in the very measure of libertarianism. For example, if two individuals expressed identical political attitudes but differed in age, Kitschelt would classify the younger one as more 'left-libertarian'. Similarly, a better-educated respondent would be classified as more left-libertarian than one who expressed the same attitudes but had less formal schooling. This is both counter-intuitive and a hindrance to empirical research. It may indeed be that younger and more educated citizens are more libertarian than older ones and we are not particularly surprised that better-educated respondents are more ready to engage in particular social movements. However, these relationships should be considered possible empirical correlates of libertarianism rather than part and parcel of its definition.

Another serious concern is that by including three variables (out of the eight or nine that are included in various specifications) that capture expressed readiness to join rather similar sorts of social movements, Kitschelt effectively loads the dice in such a way as to privilege these variables in the factors that he extracts. Indeed, these three variables do have the three strongest loadings on his first factor, which he identifies with left-libertarianism.<sup>3</sup>

Beyond these rather fundamental concerns, we are not convinced that a careful analysis of Kitschelt's data supports his claims. In Tables 1 and 2, we have, therefore, replicated his original factor analysis of the nine items noted earlier. The first two factors reported in Table 1 essentially mirror those reported by Kitschelt, who argues that because most items loaded strongly on the first factor it is 'clearly identifiable as the left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian dimension' (Kitschelt, 1994: 133). Yet, everywhere but in Germany, there is a third factor, which is curiously missing in Kitschelt's presentation of his results. This is particularly troubling given

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2. Kitschelt's analysis also uncovers a second dimension on which youth and educational attainment load on the opposite side of willingness to engage in the three protest movements. He refers to individuals who thus combine education and post-materialist values with a disinclination toward his particular social movements as 'yuppies'.

3. Kitschelt (1994: 132) claims that 'the indicators do not prejudice the analysis toward a dominant left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian dimension. It is also conceivable that class politics emerges as the dominant dimension'. We are less sure and find the latter part of this statement particularly odd given the fact that Kitschelt does not even include any conventional measure of socioeconomic class.

**Table 1.** Replication of Kitschelt's (1994) Factor Analysis by Country: Euro-Barometer 25, 1986

	Belgium	Denmark	France	Italy	Netherlands	Spain	UK	Germany
<b>Factor 1</b>								
Age	0.52	0.7	0.65	0.6	0.45	0.65	0.54	0.61
Education	-0.65	-0.62	-0.65	-0.68	-0.53	-0.58	-0.61	-0.57
White collar/Student	-0.5	-0.57	-0.54	-0.62	-0.4	-0.53	-0.48	-0.37
Being right	0	0.45	0.37	0.22	0.57	0.39	0.31	0.56
Religiosity	0.15	0.4	0.45	0.36	0.45	0.53	0.19	0.51
Post-materialism	-0.38	-0.51	-0.5	-0.44	-0.56	-0.59	-0.39	-0.6
Ecology	-0.47	-0.52	-0.54	-0.72	-0.53	-0.72	-0.63	-0.75
Antinuclear	-0.74	-0.63	-0.52	-0.66	0.67	-0.73	-0.72	-0.73
Peace Movement	-0.71	-0.66	-0.64	-0.74	0.72	-0.76	-0.75	-0.72
Explained variance	26.6	32.5	29.8	34.6	30.5	38.5	29.32	37.5
Eigenvalue	2.39	2.93	2.68	3.11	2.75	3.47	2.64	3.38
Number of cases	555	530	739	595	698	458	958	522
<b>Factor 2</b>								
Age	-0.4	-0.36	-0.39	-0.41	-0.58	-0.39	-0.49	-0.52
Education	0.22	0.48	0.46	0.55	0.6	0.62	0.6	0.58
White collar/Student	0.19	0.51	0.48	0.57	0.68	0.62	0.62	0.7



Being right	-0.57	0.17	0	0.29	0.29	-0.01	0.36	0.37
Religiosity	-0.64	-0.15	-0.21	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0	0
Post-materialism	0.47	0.17	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.25	-0.2	0
Ecology	-0.36	-0.44	-0.48	-0.4	-0.36	-0.5	-0.22	-0.31
Antinuclear	-0.41	-0.54	-0.65	0.54	-0.47	-0.55	-0.41	-0.38
Peace Movement	-0.36	-0.54	-0.57	0.47	-0.41	-0.51	-0.41	-0.25
Explained variance	18	16.7	18.1	17.4	20	20.1	17	17.1
Eigenvalue	1.62	1.5	1.62	1.57	1.8	1.81	1.53	1.54
Factor 3								
Age	-0.26	0.06	-0.12	-0.02	0.02	-0.1	0.33	
Education	0.39	0.31	0.3	0.17	0.18	0.26	0.07	
White collar/Student	0.56	0.26	0.35	0.09	0.24	0.31	0.18	
Being right	0.62	0.64	0.72	0.73	0.51	0.74	0.57	
Religiosity	0.42	0.66	0.58	0.72	0.74	0.61	0.73	
Post-materialism	-0.07	-0.1	-0.27	-0.27	-0.13	-0.19	-0.23	
Ecology	-0.38	0.29	0.21	0.21	0.34	0.15	0.22	
Antinuclear	-0.28	0.14	0.09	0.17	0.21	0.17	0.2	
Peace Movement	-0.28	0.09	0.07	0.17	0.25	0.16	0.22	
Explained variance	15.5	12.5	13.5	14	12.5	13.4	13.2	
Eigenvalue	1.39	1.13	1.21	1.26	1.13	1.2	1.19	
Number of cases	555	530	739	595	698	458	958	

**Table 2.** Replication of Kitschelt's (1994) Pooled Factor Analysis, Euro-Barometer 25, 1986

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Age	0.55	-0.46	-0.05
Education	-0.57	0.56	0.26
White collar/Student	-0.48	0.59	0.3
Being right	0.36	0.09	0.71
Religiosity	0.38	-0.26	0.64
Post-materialism	-0.49	0.19	-0.26
Ecology Movement	-0.69	-0.43	0.16
Antinuclear Movement	-0.73	-0.51	0.13
Peace Movement	-0.76	-0.47	0.14
Explained variance	32.58	18.37	13.39
Eigenvalue	2.93	1.65	1.21
Number of cases	6769	6769	6769

the fact that this factor seriously challenges the interpretation that Kitschelt favors.<sup>4</sup> In most countries, the left-right item and religiosity load more strongly on this third factor than on the first one.

A similar principal components analysis for the entire Euro-Barometer sample is presented in Table 2. Note that in his own pooled analysis, Kitschelt excludes the left-right identification measure. The pooled results are very similar to those reported for the individual countries and clearly suggest that left-right self-placement and religiosity load on a separate third factor. And while conservatism and religiosity are thus positively correlated, the factor on which they most significantly load is only modestly associated with education (positively) and post-materialism (negatively), and only very weakly (but positively) related to the respondents' willingness to join the three particular social movements.

While there is considerable cross-national variation, these results suggest that Kitschelt's first factor is not 'clearly identifiable' as a left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian dimension. Only in Germany, where there is no third factor capturing conservatism, is there any support for Kitschelt's more general claim. Hence, by his own measures, Kitschelt's argument that there is an attitudinal clustering amongst the left, those valuing civic and democratic political participation, the young and educated, post-materialist, and non-believers is simply not supported even by his own measures, as controversial as these may be.

4. Jackman and Miller (1996) offer a similar critique of the factor analysis undertaken by Putnam (1993).

### Libertarianism and Authoritarianism

It is common to see libertarian values as constituting one end of a value dimension, the other extreme of which is authoritarianism. This is indeed Kitschelt's conception and, in this section, we examine this claim. To the extent that it is true, items measuring authoritarianism and libertarianism should load on a single factor *and* have opposite signs. We believe instead that individuals of different political beliefs may vary as much in the types of authority that they value as in their general orientation toward order. Demands for personal freedom, we believe, may take a variety of forms and such value priorities are not necessarily antithetical to all valuations of order. In order for citizens to live their lives autonomously, for example, societal transparency and predictability are necessary and these conditions can, in turn, give rise to a preference for certain types of social order, such as notably the rule of law. Thus, libertarians value the rule of law (especially the protection of life, liberty, property, and private agreements) positively but most other forms of authority, such as intensive regulation of family life or commerce by governments or religious authorities, negatively. Those who adhere to other political values may similarly discriminate between different forms of authority. Contrary to Kitschelt, we, therefore, hypothesize that authoritarianism and libertarianism may load on separate dimensions and not be highly correlated. We also believe that the specific measures that are used to capture authoritarian beliefs can easily influence the results that emerge.

This section examines the empirical relationship between libertarian and authoritarian values in contemporary Western Europe. To obtain a fair assessment of the relationship between libertarian and authoritarian values, we construct a measure of political libertarianism that consists exclusively of general attitudinal components that are not obviously biased toward the right or the left. Hence, we *exclude* basic sociodemographic characteristics or items that measure participation in acts (such as anti-nuclear demonstrations or anti-abortion protests) that clearly attract individuals of particular ideological persuasions.

We include in the analysis two different samples corresponding to the administration of the first (1990–93) and second (1995–97) waves of the World Values Survey. From the 1990 wave, we selected five items that we believe are balanced measures of both libertarianism (both political and economic) and authoritarian predispositions. The measure of political libertarianism is based on a question that asks the respondent to choose between more freedom versus equality (a high score is associated with the equality end of the scale). We include three economic libertarianism items: support for income equality (low score is egalitarian, high libertarian); support for private ownership (low score is support for private ownership); and belief

in individuals assuming responsibility for themselves (indicated by a low score). Finally, we include a measure of authoritarianism that is based on whether the respondent would approve if in the future there would be greater respect for authority (a low score indicates such approval). From the 1995–97 wave of World Values, we selected the same items with one exception: the freedom versus equality item was not asked in 1995–97. Instead, we have for the 1995–97 World Values Survey included an item (No. 6) that asked respondents to choose whether the most important responsibility of government was maintaining order or respecting freedom. A high score indicates a preference for order. (See the Appendixes for the specific survey items.)

The results of the factor analysis are presented in Tables 3A and 3B. For 11 of our 13 countries, the analysis yields a two-dimensional solution. The economic and political libertarian items load on the first factor and the authoritarianism item on a second factor of its own. Only for Britain and The Netherlands does the analysis produce only one factor. Even in these two cases, however, the loading of our authoritarianism measure is only modest. The results thus suggest that the authoritarianism and libertarianism items do not load on a single factor. Instead, two separate factors emerge from the analysis. This suggests that libertarian and authoritarian attitudes are quite distinct and hardly represent the two ends of a political value continuum. More likely, what most prominently divides the contemporary electorate is a libertarian–communitarian value dimension, captured by the first factor in Tables 3A and 3B.

### **Left–Right Placement and Libertarianism**

Kitschelt argues that citizens' social and political preferences are increasingly aligned with this left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian dimension. More and more, he argues, leftists are becoming libertarians and rightists authoritarians. Similar themes appear in many other characterizations of 'post-modern' electoral politics. Flanagan (1987: 1307) describes a libertarian dimension of the contemporary electorate that appeals primarily to the 'New Left' and an authoritarian dimension that appeals primarily to the 'New Right'. This new dimension overlies the materialist/non-materialist cleavage popularized by Inglehart (1977). Like Kitschelt, Flanagan (1987) finds that the libertarian–authoritarian dimension is strongly correlated with left–right identification.<sup>5</sup> Palmer (1995) presents evidence from the British

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5. Although Flanagan (1987) argues that because of cross-cutting pressures from the materialist non-materialist dimension, the correlation with the Libertarianism–Authoritarianism dimension will be moderated.

case indicating that libertarian–authoritarian values are correlated with left–right partisan preferences.

Although Kitschelt argues for a distinction between political and economic libertarianism, we are inclined to believe that economic and political libertarianism (defined in our terms) are positively correlated. Moreover, Kitschelt asserts that the left will be politically libertarian and that the right will be authoritarian. We argue exactly the opposite: supporters of capitalism and free markets (who are most likely to be found on the moderate right) tend to be libertarian, while the left embraces communitarian values that are, in many cases, antithetical to libertarianism.

In Table 4, we present the correlations of left–right self-identification measure with the factor scores from the factor dimensions from Tables 3A and 3B. The first factor in Tables 3A and 3B captures a combination of political and economic libertarianism (note that a high score on the 1990–93 construct indicates ‘non-libertarianism’ while a high score on the 1995–97 construct indicates ‘libertarianism’). The strong negative correlation in 1990–93 and positive correlation in 1995–97 with the first factor suggests that the right is significantly more libertarian than the left, a result that is highly significant in virtually all of our countries.

Note also that the results for the second factor, which is quite clearly identifiable as authoritarianism, are much less impressive and consistent. While in the pooled analysis, there is a weak positive association between rightism and authoritarianism, this correlation is in many individual countries either insignificant or even negative. Even in the best of cases, left–right self-placement explains only a tiny proportion of the variance in authoritarianism. Respondents on the political right are thus distinguished much more strongly and consistently by their libertarianism than by their authoritarianism. These results are clearly consistent with our argument.

### **Left, Right, and Participation**

Kitschelt’s characterization of the political left and right implies that their respective partisans have very distinctive attitudes toward (1) individual rights and freedoms and (2) participatory democracy. In advanced capitalist societies, left-libertarians are ‘cosmopolitans’ who prefer local self-government, strong parliaments, and weak executives. By contrast, right-authoritarians are ‘particularists’ who rally around their respective nation or ethnic group and advocate strong central decision-making authority. The church, according to Kitschelt, is an institution, often associated with the right, that promotes authoritarian as opposed to democratic values. Rather than promoting citizen self-governance and participation, the church favors a narrow scope of political jurisdiction. In the same vein, the church

Table 3A. Libertarian Factors, World Values 1990–93

	Freedom/ Equality	Income equality	Ownership	Responsibility	Respect/ Authority	Explained variance	Eigenvalue	Number of cases
Factor 1								
France	0.6	-0.55	0.75	0.66	0.13	33.43	1.67	791
Britain	0.36	-0.54	0.69	0.73	0.35	31	1.55	1359
Germany	0.52	-0.63	0.74	0.64	0.23	33.67	1.68	1651
Italy	0.13	-0.48	0.75	0.66	0.28	27.32	1.37	1681
Netherlands	0.46	-0.69	0.65	0.66	0.4	33.91	1.7	913
Denmark	0.51	-0.71	0.76	0.72	0.18	37.66	1.88	904
Belgium	0.49	-0.52	0.71	0.68	0	29.39	1.47	2199
Spain	0.43	-0.47	0.75	0.64	0.28	28.93	1.45	3100
Ireland	0.24	-0.53	0.66	0.73	0.31	28	1.4	980
Norway	0.49	-0.68	0.65	0.67	0.31	33.42	1.67	1145
Sweden	0.64	-0.66	0.75	0.68	-0.02	37.64	1.88	949
Finland	0.32	-0.76	0.79	0.74	0.01	36.99	1.85	433
Portugal	0.34	0.13	0.78	0.77	0.17	26.94	1.35	994
Pooled results	0.51	-0.58	0.71	0.68	-0.11	31.51	1.58	17099
Factor 2								
France	-0.27	0.39	0.15	0.22	0.86	20.7	1.03	791
Germany	-0.49	-0.09	0.03	-0.05	0.88	20.55	1.03	1651
Italy	-0.71	0.47	0.01	0.23	0.53	21.17	1.06	1681
Denmark	-0.43	0	0.02	0.06	0.91	20.32	1.02	904
Belgium	-0.41	-0.21	0.18	-0.04	0.9	20.94	1.05	2199
Spain	-0.52	0.48	0.06	0.35	0.65	20.93	1.05	3100
Ireland	-0.75	0.08	-0.07	0.08	0.68	21.08	1.05	980
Norway	-0.38	-0.09	-0.33	0.11	0.86	20.32	1.02	1145
Sweden	-0.2	-0.11	0.08	0.01	0.98	20.33	1.02	949

Finland	0.22	0.07	0.04	-0.08	0.97	20.09	1.00	433
Portugal	-0.52	0.75	-0.02	-0.02	0.56	22.73	1.14	994
Pooled results	-0.39	-0.05	0.23	0.15	0.9	20.58	1.03	17099

**Table 3B.** Libertarian Factors, World Values 1995-97

	Income equality	Ownership	Responsibility authority	Respect	Order versus Freedom	Explained variance	Eigenvalue	Number of cases
<b>Factor 1</b>								
Germany	0.71	-0.45	0.78	0.23	0.16	27.85	1.39	1017
Spain	0.74	0.01	0.78	0.33	0.18	25.81	1.29	1211
Norway	0.66	-0.51	0.67	-0.36	-0.37	27.99	1.4	1127
Sweden	0.62	-0.78	0.73	-0.2	-0.21	26.76	1.34	1009
Finland	0.77	-0.33	0.78	-0.17	0	26.76	1.34	984
Pooled results	0.64	-0.51	0.78	0.31	0	27.67	1.36	5348
<b>Factor 2</b>								
Germany	-0.29	0.15	0	0.73	0.75	24.05	1.2	1017
Spain	-0.3	0.14	-0.18	0.67	0.75	23.1	1.16	1211
Norway	0.14	-0.39	0.27	0.64	0.64	21.2	1.06	1127
Sweden	0.18	-0.18	0.01	0.73	0.72	22.31	1.12	1009
Finland	0	-0.12	0.15	0.72	0.77	22.76	1.14	984
Pooled results	-0.35	0	0	0.71	0.71	22.5	1.13	5348

**Table 4.** Correlations Between Libertarian Factors and Identification with the Right: World Values Survey 1990–93 and 1995–97

	First factor	Second factor	Number of cases
A. 1990–93 Wave of World Values Survey			
France	−0.37 <sup>b</sup>	−0.11 <sup>b</sup>	653
Britain	−0.40 <sup>b</sup>	n.a.	1261
Germany	−0.33 <sup>b</sup>	−0.18 <sup>b</sup>	1507
Italy	−0.30 <sup>b</sup>	0.09 <sup>b</sup>	1330
Netherlands	−0.44 <sup>b</sup>	n.a.	864
Denmark	−0.52 <sup>b</sup>	−0.08 <sup>a</sup>	836
Belgium	−0.21 <sup>b</sup>	−0.16 <sup>b</sup>	1688
Spain	−0.38 <sup>b</sup>	00.01	2434
Ireland	−0.21 <sup>b</sup>	−0.12 <sup>b</sup>	890
Norway	−0.49 <sup>b</sup>	−0.01	1079
Sweden	−0.55 <sup>b</sup>	−0.09 <sup>b</sup>	871
Finland	−0.54 <sup>b</sup>	−0.15 <sup>b</sup>	401
Portugal	−0.08 <sup>a</sup>	0.07 <sup>a</sup>	940
Pooled Results	−0.35 <sup>b</sup>	−0.16 <sup>b</sup>	14754
B. 1995–97 Wave of World Values Survey			
Germany	0.22 <sup>b</sup>	−0.31 <sup>b</sup>	1017
Spain	0.03	−0.25 <sup>b</sup>	1211
Norway	0.42 <sup>b</sup>	0.10 <sup>b</sup>	1127
Sweden	0.52 <sup>b</sup>	0.03	1009
Finland	0.36 <sup>b</sup>	−0.06 <sup>a</sup>	984
Pooled results	0.30 <sup>b</sup>	−0.09 <sup>b</sup>	5348

Note: <sup>a</sup>  $p < .05$  <sup>b</sup>  $p < .01$

advocates an authoritative and authoritarian decision mode rather than citizens' self-governance and participation.

Kitschelt, like a number of other 'New Politics' theorists, thus argues that the left distinguishes itself from the right by the enthusiasm with which it embraces civic or democratic (defined broadly) participation. The left, he argues, increasingly champions these two values while the right is much less likely to do so. Kitschelt believes that the left will be much more aggressive in its advocacy of individual liberties (autonomy) and civic participation. The right, however, will be much less interested in participatory norms and in championing individual autonomy and liberty. He notes: 'The new authoritarianism values a "natural" hierarchical community, deference to political authority, the return to a stable patriarchal division of labor between the sexes, and an ethic of personal discipline' (Kitschelt, 1994: 23).



We suspect that observed associations between participation and leftism may be based on faulty research strategies. In many instances, the evidence of enthusiasm for civic participation on the part of the left (and the obverse for the right) is based on measures of participation that privilege particular activities favored by the left. If the goal is accurately to gauge civic participation (or enthusiasm for such), then the specific participatory items should be either ideologically neutral or at least balanced (i.e. a mix of ideologically-charged participatory acts that appeal to the right and the left, respectively).

Kitschelt's evidence of conservative antipathy toward democratic participation is a good illustration of this problem. Recall that Kitschelt opts to measure enthusiasm for civic participation through three survey items that have traditionally been employed to gauge 'unconventional' political participation, namely support for ecology, anti-nuclear, and anti-war movements. But support for these specific politically charged 'movements' is hardly a broad-gauged or ideologically balanced measure of 'participatory norms' and, hence, not a reasonable manner to evaluate the participatory predispositions of the right versus the left.

The critical empirical issue is whether Kitschelt's results are an artifact of his measurement strategy. We evaluate this possibility by employing an alternative set of measures of political participation that are more 'conventional' in nature and at least closer to 'issue neutrality'. The empirical test takes the form of correlations between left-right self-identification and four participation measures. This battery includes measures of participation in 'unconventional' acts and protest politics but also more general and less ideological measures of political engagement. The data are from the 1986 Euro-Barometer 25, the same survey used by Kitschelt (1994). The results are presented for each of the Euro-Barometer countries. Note that we include both Kitschelt's measures of participation (the three 'unconventional' participation items) and a more neutral measure of conventional 'political mobilization'. The latter is based simply on a question that asks respondents to indicate how often they discuss politics with friends. We expect to find that the left more enthusiastically than the right embraces the politically charged unconventional participatory acts but that there is no significant difference in the more conventional and issue-neutral measures of political participation. The results are reported in Table 5.

As we would expect, there is a strong correlation between leftist self-placement and willingness to join these three activist movements. Thus, as we might expect, in a number of countries left-identifiers are more likely to participate in movements associated with anti-war, anti-nuclear, and pro-ecology sympathies. In virtually all countries, leftists show a greater readiness than rightists to join all these movements and, in the great majority of cases, these differences are statistically significant.

**Table 5.** Correlation of Left right Self-Identification and Participation Measures Euro-Barometer 25, 1986

	Left-right self-identification correlated with				Approximate <i>N</i>
	Ecology	Anti- nuclear	Anti- war	Political mobilization	
France	-0.08 <sup>a</sup>	-0.11 <sup>b</sup>	-0.15 <sup>b</sup>	-0.08 <sup>a</sup>	888
Britain	-0.11 <sup>b</sup>	-0.16 <sup>b</sup>	-0.19 <sup>b</sup>	0.05	1212
Germany	-0.27 <sup>b</sup>	-0.29 <sup>b</sup>	-0.23 <sup>b</sup>	0	966
Italy	-0.08 <sup>a</sup>	-0.13 <sup>b</sup>	-0.13 <sup>b</sup>	-0.10 <sup>b</sup>	918
The Netherlands	-0.21 <sup>b</sup>	-0.31 <sup>b</sup>	-0.34 <sup>b</sup>	-0.05	946
Denmark	-0.17 <sup>b</sup>	-0.22 <sup>b</sup>	-0.22 <sup>b</sup>	0.02	946
Belgium	-0.05	-0.03	0.03	-0.03	821
Spain	-0.18 <sup>b</sup>	-0.16 <sup>b</sup>	-0.18 <sup>b</sup>	-0.17 <sup>b</sup>	703
Ireland	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.09 <sup>b</sup>	886
Greece	-0.19 <sup>b</sup>	-0.25 <sup>b</sup>	-0.29 <sup>b</sup>	-0.17 <sup>b</sup>	832
Portugal	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.03	798
Luxembourg	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04	-0.08	261

Note: <sup>a</sup>  $p < .05$ , <sup>b</sup>  $p < .01$

But the fact that the left is more likely to participate in these particular movements is hardly evidence that they are more enthusiastic advocates of civic participation in general. Our more conventional and less ideologically charged measure of *political mobilization* indicates that the left does not have a significant participatory advantage. In four of the 12 countries (all Mediterranean), the correlation is indeed negative, supporting the notion that the left is more participatory. But in one case (Ireland) the correlation is exactly the opposite. And in the remaining seven cases, the correlation is not significant. On the whole, these correlations with conventional political mobilization suggest that citizens of the right are as engaged in conventional politic acts as are citizens of the left.

We also examine the participatory patterns of the right versus the left with data from the World Values Survey. Here, we include widely employed measures of conventional and unconventional participation that were included in both the 1990–93 and 1995–97 World Values Surveys. The measures of conventional participation include attention to, or interest in, politics in general, discussion of politics on a frequent basis, and membership in political parties. Unconventional participation is measured by whether respondents have recently signed a petition, joined a boycott, attended an unlawful demonstration, participated in an unlawful strike, or occupied a building. We expect that the right and left do not differ significantly in their enthusiasm for conventional forms of participation. However, the left will be more enthusiastic regarding the unconventional activities partly

**Table 6.** Patterns of Political Participation, Factor Loadings: World Values Survey, 1990–93 and 1995–97

	1990–93 World Values		1995–97 World Values	
	Factor I Unconventional participation	Factor II Conventional participation	Factor I Unconventional participation	Factor II Conventional participation
Sign petition	0.66	0	0.65	0
Join boycott	0.75	–0.22	0.73	–0.17
Lawful demonstration	0.76	–0.2	0.74	–0.2
Unofficial strikes	0.66	–0.4	0.6	–0.48
Occupy building	0.61	–0.47	0.51	–0.46
Interested in politics	0.61	0.6	0.65	0.53
Discuss politics	0.57	0.6	0.6	0.52
Party membership	0.3	0.47	0.23	0.51
Explained variance	40	17	38	17
Eigenvalue	3.17	1.4	3.03	1.33
<i>N</i>	16708	16708	5337	5337

because they challenge traditional authority but also simply because a number of these items (such as unofficial strikes and building occupations) are tactics typically associated with leftist movements critical of established property rights.

Table 6 presents the results of the factor analyses conducted to create the conventional and unconventional participation measures. This confirmatory factor analysis of both conventional and unconventional participation measures suggests two separate factor components. In both waves of the World Values Survey, the unconventional participation items all clearly load on a separate dimension. The conventional participation items tend to load relatively highly on both dimensions. Yet, there is clearly a separate dimension generated by our more general measures of ‘conventional’ participation. Overall, these results suggest distinctions between conventional and unconventional participation.

We use the factor scores from these two separate factor analyses in order to evaluate the argument that ‘left-libertarians’ are more enthusiastic about democratic participation than ‘right-authoritarians’. Table 7 simply correlates the conventional and unconventional scores with the left–right self-identification measure. As we expected, there is a very strong correlation between participation in unconventional political acts and left–right self-identification. This confirms Kitschelt’s argument that the left is more likely to engage in acts that challenge traditional authority, even though left–right self-placement explains only a modest part of the observed variance.

**Table 7.** Correlations between Participation Scales and Identification with the Right: World Values Survey, 1990–93 and 1995–97

	1990–93 World Values		1995–97 World Values	
	Correlation	N	Correlation	N
Unconventional participation				
Conventional participation				
Unconventional participation				
Conventional participation				
	Correlation	N	Correlation	N
France	-0.38 <sup>b</sup>	1002	-0.17 <sup>b</sup>	1002
Britain	-0.22	1484	0.11 <sup>b</sup>	1484
West Germany	-0.35 <sup>b</sup>	2101	-0.03	2101
Italy	-0.29 <sup>b</sup>	2018	-0.16 <sup>b</sup>	2018
Netherlands	-0.39 <sup>b</sup>	1017	-0.02	1017
Denmark	-0.39 <sup>b</sup>	1030	-0.01	1030
Belgium	-0.21 <sup>b</sup>	2792	0.04 <sup>b</sup>	2792
Spain	-0.33 <sup>b</sup>	4147	-0.15 <sup>b</sup>	4147
Ireland	-0.16 <sup>b</sup>	1000	0.11 <sup>b</sup>	1000
Norway	-0.22 <sup>b</sup>	1239	0.04	1239
Sweden	-0.23 <sup>b</sup>	1047	-0.01	1047
Finland	-0.28 <sup>b</sup>	588	0	588
Portugal	-0.16 <sup>b</sup>	1185	-0.07 <sup>a</sup>	1185
Pooled results	-0.26 <sup>b</sup>	20,650	-0.01	20,650
			-0.24 <sup>b</sup>	5,334
				5348

Note: <sup>a</sup>  $p < .05$ , <sup>b</sup>  $p < .01$

The evidence that the right and left differ with respect to conventional participation is much less convincing. For Europe as a whole and over both waves of the World Values survey, there is no overall correlation between conventional participation (the second factor) and left–right self-identification. In the first wave, there is some limited country-specific evidence that the left is more engaged in conventional participation – this is the case in France, Italy, Spain, and possibly Portugal. However, in Belgium, Britain, and Ireland, the participatory edge belongs to the right. Elsewhere, the correlations are statistically insignificant. In the second wave, the left is more inclined to participate in Germany and Spain, whereas in the other countries the correlation is insignificant. Thus, leftists and rightists differ little in their rates of conventional political participation but the left is more likely to participate in unconventional acts. Since unconventional participation is often associated with causes championed by the left (such as environmental mobilizations or protests against liberal trade regimes), this comes as little surprise. Thus, what most clearly differentiates leftist citizens from rightists with respect to participation is, first and foremost, their propensity to engage in unconventional, including illegal and violent, political action. Yet, this is to focus on political acts that most citizens, left or right, forego. Except for signing petitions, most of these unconventional political acts have been and remain in the repertoire of only small percentage of democratic citizens (Dalton, 2002). Most other forms of unconventional participation are rare among leftists as well as among rightists, though less so among the former.

### **Party Manifestos and Libertarian Policies**

Kitschelt's analysis of left-libertarianism is embedded in a series of studies of major party families in contemporary democracies. His objective is to explain the rise of parties of the 'radical right', as well as the fate of social democrats across the European continent. Likewise, we shall therefore shift our attention to the ways in which party politics in contemporary democracies have been influenced by the value trends that we have discussed.

One of the challenges for students of political behavior in the mature democracies is explaining the success of right-of-center parties in the 1980s and again in recent years. For many, this represented a paradox because they believed that 'modern' democratic electorates had embraced post-industrial or post-materialist values. Hence, the 'New Politics' literature essentially argues that conservative partisanship can be interpreted as representing support for illiberal ideas, antagonism to democratic participation, and support for authoritarian structures and institutions.

If what characterizes post-modern politics is 'representation from above' (Esaiasson and Holmberg, 1996), then the evolution of a left-libertarian politics may be more visible among political parties than in the attitudes of the voters. Thus, mass surveys may poorly reflect the new dimensionality of democratic politics even though the parties may, in fact, have embraced this dimensionality in their appeals. At any rate, while Kitschelt (1994) certainly recognizes that not all established socialist parties in Western Europe have effectively responded to the new electoral forces by taking left-libertarian positions, he clearly argues that the trend is for leftist parties to become more libertarian and for parties of the right to become more authoritarian.

We test this argument through an analysis of party platforms or manifestos (Laver and Budge, 1992). Our interest is in whether Western European parties align themselves on a left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian dimension and, second, whether this dimensionality has strengthened over the recent decades. We use the party position data developed by the Party Manifesto Research Group (MRG) to evaluate trends in party platforms over the 1950–89 period.<sup>6</sup> The countries included in this analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and the United States. Four scales developed by the MRG represent reasonable measures of economic libertarianism: support for free enterprise; support for market regulation; support for economic planning; and support for government controls over the economy. These seem to be policy categories that tap basic liberal attitudes to the economy. In addition to this economic measure of libertarianism, we also assess the association through a measure of political libertarianism. Three scales developed by the MRG represent measures of political libertarianism comprising support for (1) freedom and human rights, (2) democracy, and (3) constitutionalism (the positive references).

The results of a principal components analysis of these items are presented in Table 8. Following Gabel and Huber (2000), we aggregate the MRG data over all countries and for the entire time period of 1950–89. The factor analysis of the four MRG party platform items for all countries and the entire 1950–89 period results in one 'Economic Libertarianism' factor (note that high scores indicate low levels of libertarianism). The loadings range from .36 to .69. Similarly there is a single 'Political Libertarianism' factor emerging from the factor analysis with loadings ranging from .54 to .74. We position the parties on the economic and political libertarian dimensions

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6. For a detailed description of the methodology employed in coding the party manifestos, see Budge et al. (1987: Ch. 2 and Appendixes A and B).

**Table 8.** Clustering of Party Positions on  
(A) Economic Policy Issues and (B) Political  
Libertarian Issues: Factor Loadings for the Party  
Manifesto Data, 1950–89

	Factor 1
A. Economic policy issues	
Free enterprise	−0.62
Market regulation	0.58
Economic planning	0.36
Controlled economy	0.69
Explained variance	32.9
Eigenvalue	1.32
Number of cases	1160
B. Political libertarian issues	
Freedom/Human rights	0.74
Democracy	0.69
Constitutionalism, positive	0.54
Explained variance	43.7
Eigenvalue	1.31
Number of cases	1160

using standard regression scoring. Hence, each party for each year has one economic and one political libertarianism score.

Kitschelt suggests that parties of the left should take more politically libertarian positions than parties of the right. Moreover, political libertarianism should be negatively correlated with positions favoring markets and capitalist economies. Finally, over time the left should become more libertarian and the right less so. We evaluate this in Table 9 where we compare the average libertarianism scores for the major right and left parties for five European countries. Here we have been able to add data for the 1990s, so that we can subdivide our sample into the periods 1950–69, 1970–89, and 1990–99. Note that with respect to economic libertarianism, parties of the right are generally more libertarian than those of the left. On political libertarianism, the patterns are less stable and clear-cut. The highest political libertarianism scores are accounted for by parties of the center or center-right, such as the FDP in Germany and the DC in Italy (in the earliest period). Parties of the moderate left exhibit relatively libertarian scores in some countries (France and The Netherlands) but not in others (Italy and the United Kingdom).

In the 1990s, the right and left have statistically indistinguishable scores on this measure in most countries. With respect to the association between political and economic libertarianism, the correlation between the two measures for the countries in this sample is essentially zero (.05 and not statistically significant).

Finally, note that the temporal trends provide little support for Kitschelt's argument. Table 9 compares the mean party 'economy/non-libertarian' and 'freedom and human rights' scores for the three different periods (1950–69, 1970–89 and 1990–98). There certainly is no linear trend over this period. In some countries, such as France, Germany, and The Netherlands, there has been a recent trend **away** from political libertarianism and this trend applies to parties of the left no less than to others. On economic policies, some of the larger center-right parties remain consistently (though rather modestly) libertarian throughout the three periods. This includes the Conservatives in the UK, the Christian Democrats in Italy and the Dutch and German Liberals. The Italian Communists and the Dutch and British Labour parties have moved to the center ground on economic policies but remain significantly less libertarian than competing center-right parties. In addition, note that, for many of the parties of the right, the 1970–89 period was marked by a libertarian shift that was subsequently moderated.

In sum, two essential points can be made. The trend across European countries in the direction of greater support for political libertarianism is modest and inconsistent. The notion that the left is becoming more libertarian while the right is becoming less so is simply inconsistent with the empirical data. Moreover, the typical left–right differences are exactly contrary to those predicted by Kitschelt: The most politically libertarian parties are found on the center-right.<sup>7</sup>

### Summary and Discussion

A number of scholars have argued that political values have significantly changed as democracies mature. Moreover, there is a considerable literature suggesting that the right and left have, in some sense, realigned along new post-modern or post-materialist values. Kitschelt is a leading proponent of

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7. We also tested for trends in libertarianism in a separate factor analysis of the same four items for the periods 1950–69 versus 1970–89. If, in fact, the left has increasingly championed libertarian issues, then we would expect the factor analysis solution for the more recent period to be significantly different and probably to account for less of the variation in these four items. In fact, the factor analysis results for the two periods were very similar. Both generated one factor that accounts for between 32 and 33 percent of the variance. For 1970–89, the economic planning item had a weaker loading (.28) compared to the earlier period (.46).



**Table 9.** Changes in Libertarian Party Positions, 1950–69; 1970–89 and 1990–99: UK, Italy France, Germany, and The Netherlands

	Economic Non-Libertarianism			Freedom-Human Rights		
	1950–69	1970–89	1990–99	1950–69	1970–89	1990–99
France						
Communist	0.67	1.82	1.57	-0.05	0.11	-0.01
Socialist Party	0.95	0.98	0.32	0.58	0.90	0.56
Gaullist/RPR	0.13	-1.00	0.33	0.67	0.75	-0.07
Germany						
SPD	0.49	-0.05	0.19	0.37	0.06	-0.70
FDP	-0.21	-0.12	-0.80	0.97	1.21	-0.26
CDU/CSU	-0.09	-0.19	-0.18	-0.43	0.35	-0.78
The Netherlands						
Labour	0.57	0.86	-0.06	0.23	0.29	-0.31
Liberal	-1.35	-0.77	-0.34	-0.13	0.10	-0.33
KVP/CDA	-0.89	0.20/ 0.69	0.13	-0.35	-0.28/ 0.86	-0.37
Italy						
Communist Party	0.24	0.16	0.19	0.80	-0.06	-0.06
PSI	0.04	-0.13	0.53	-0.21	-0.28	-0.59
Republican Party	0.06	-0.39	-1.14	-0.02	-0.38	-0.25
Christian Democrats	-0.28	-0.17	-0.15	1.14	-0.32	0.02
UK						
Labour	1.14	1.15	0.14	-0.62	-0.11	-0.39
Liberal/Social Democrats	-0.07	0.92	0.11	-0.04	0.72	0.07
Conservative	-0.15	-0.66	-0.32	-0.43	-0.02	-0.36

Source: Party Manifesto Data Base.

this view, arguing that political conflict in mature democracies is increasingly organized around a right-authoritarian versus left-libertarian dimension.

We have provided both a theoretical and an empirical reconsideration of Kitschelt's argument. We have also specifically assessed his notion that conservative partisans less enthusiastically embrace libertarian values or engage in democratic participation than those of the left. Our replication of his analysis raises serious questions about construct validity, as well as about his empirical results. Second, our analysis of survey data from the Euro-Barometer and World Values Surveys leads us to question the notion that the political left is libertarian and the right anti-libertarian. Third, the notion that conservative partisans less enthusiastically embrace democratic participation than do those on the left applies almost exclusively to acts of unconditional political participation. Finally, as far as we can judge the programs

of the political parties that compete for these citizens' support, it is not true that leftist parties are more libertarian than those on the right, or that, in recent decades, the former have particularly trended in a libertarian direction.

The overall goal of this essay has been to provide a better understanding of the structure of the electoral issue space in advanced democracies. We have, therefore, proposed an alternative perspective on the contemporary electorate. Libertarianism does, in fact, represent an important dimension of its issue preferences. Yet, libertarianism has a much different character from what Kitschelt proposes. Moreover, the counterpoint to libertarianism among contemporary voters is not authoritarianism but rather communitarianism. Respondents on the (moderate) right are, in fact, the most libertarian, whereas those citizens who sympathize with the left tend toward the opposite pole, i.e. they are drawn more to communitarianism than to libertarianism.

Authoritarianism, however, is a separate dimension not very strongly associated with either libertarianism or with left-right self-placement. Most likely, there are different forms of authoritarianism that typify the left and the right, respectively. Empirical studies, we believe, have often been insufficiently attentive to such differences and the results may, therefore, have been biased.

There may indeed be a specter of libertarianism haunting Europe but it is not exactly the phenomenon described by Kitschelt. At the same time, there is also a worrisome rise of radical populist politics in which one can certainly find authoritarian themes. Yet, these protest movements in countries such as Belgium, Italy, Austria, France, and The Netherlands have been fueled not only by demands for order but also (and perhaps more significantly) by a *rejection* of the established orders of cozy, profitable, and often corrupt political cartels (Katz and Mair, 1995; Rose, 2000). The best antidote to such populism is probably a transparent and competitive political order. At any rate, the recent victories of more moderate parties supporting democratic capitalism should in no way be read as a harbinger of a coming age of authoritarianism.

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### Appendix 1: Measures from Euro-Barometer (1986)

*White collar/student* occupation is a dichotomous variable that assumes a value of 1 for the following reported occupations: professional – lawyers, accountants, etc.; white collar – office worker; executive, top management, director; student, military service. It is zero otherwise.

*Support for social movements* is measured by the following question (Euro-Barometer codes in parentheses): ‘There are a number of groups seeking the support of the public. For each one of the following movements could you tell me whether you are a member (1), or might join (2) or would certainly not join (3).’ The three groups used in the analysis are: *ecology*, *anti-nuclear*, and *peace movement* groups. The Don’t Knows and Refusals were set to missing values.

The *post-materialism* measure is based on the standard four-item post-materialism index developed by Inglehart (1977). We use the constructed variable provided in the Euro-Barometer 25 data set.

*Religiosity* is measured by the following religiosity self-placement question: ‘Indicate your attitude about religion on this scale? Position 1 shows that you consider yourself as someone who is not at all religious. Position 10 shows that you consider yourself as someone who is completely religious. Would you please indicate, on this scale from 1–10, where you think you are on the point of view of your religion?’

*Being Right* is measured by the following left–right self-placement scale question: ‘In political matters, people talk of “the Left” and the “Right”. How would you place your views on this scale? Left is coded 1 and Right is coded 10.’

*Political mobilization* is based on responses to the following question: ‘When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?’

*Education* is measured by the following question: ‘How old were you when you finished your full-time education?’

### Appendix 2: Measures from the World Values Survey (1990–93 and 1995–97)

#### *Neutral Participation Scale*

The *unconventional participation* items are based on responses to the following question: ‘Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.’ The political actions were: *signing a petition*; *joining a boycott*; *attending lawful demonstrations*; *joining unofficial strikes*; *occupying buildings or factories*.

*Interest in politics* is measured by responses to the following question: ‘How interested would you say you are in politics?’ The response set is: very interested; somewhat interested; not very interested; not at all interested.

*Political discussion* is based on responses to the following question: ‘When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?’

*Party membership* is based on responses to the following question: 'Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say . . . (a) which, if any, do you belong to? And if yes, (b) which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for?'

### *Libertarianism Index*

The following questions were employed as items in the libertarianism index.

*Item 1 (1990–93 only).* 'Which of these two statements comes closest to your own opinion?'

A. I find that both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance.

B. Certainly both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is under-privileged and that social class differences are not so strong.'

Respondents could indicate whether (1) they agreed with statement A; (2) Agree with neither/depends; or (3) agree with statement B.

*Items 2 (1990–93 only), 3, and 4.* 'Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right, or you can choose any number in between.

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| A. Incomes should be made more equal  | There should be greater incentives for individual effort                           |
| B. Private ownership of business and industry should be increased           | Government ownership of business and industry should be increased                  |
| C. Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves | The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for' |

*Item 5.* 'Here is a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?' The item employed in the measure is 'Greater respect for authority'. The response set is: (1) good; (2) don't mind; (3) bad.

*Item 6 (1995–97 only).* 'If you had to choose, which would you say is the most important responsibility of government: (1) To maintain order in society; or (2) To respect the freedom of the individual.'

### **Appendix 3: Party Manifesto Items**

#### *Political Libertarianism*

*Democracy:* Favourable mention of democracy as method or goal in national and other organizations; support for worker participation; for involvement of all citizens in decision-making, as well as generalized support for symbols of democracy.

*Constitutionalism Positive:* Support for specified aspects of a formal constitution, use of constitutionalism as an argument for policy as well as generalized approval for 'constitutional' way of doing things.

*Freedom and Human Rights:* Favourable mentions of importance of personal freedom, civil rights, freedom of choice in education; freedom from bureaucratic control, freedom of speech; freedom from coercion in industrial and political sphere; individualism.

#### *Economic Liberalism*

*Free Enterprise:* Favourable mention of private property rights; personal enterprise and initiative; need for the economy of unhampered individual enterprises; favourable mention of free enterprise capitalism; superiority of individual enterprise over state, and over state buying or management systems.

*Market Regulation:* Need for regulations designed to make private enterprise work better; actions against monopolies and trusts and in defence of consumer and small businessmen; anti-profiteering.

*Economic Planning:* Favourable mention of central planning of consultative or indicative nature; need for this and for government department to create national plan; need to plan imports and exports.

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